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INTRODUCTIONI

*
Professor of Law and Director, Online Mental Disability Law Program, New York Law School; Director, International Mental Disability Law
Reform Project, Justice Action Center. Portions of this paper were presented at
the biennial congress of the International Academy of Law and Mental Health,
July 2009 (NYC), at the annual meeting of the Human Dignity and Humiliation
Network, December 2011 (NYC), at the Prato Workshop on Coercive Care:
Law and Policy, sponsored by the Monash University Centre for the Advancement of Law and Mental Health, May 2012 (Prato, Italy), and the Association of
American Law Schools' annual meeting, January 2013 (New Orleans, LA). The
author wishes to thank Alison Lynch for her helpful research and editorial assistance.
1. See generally, Michael L. Perlin, "There Are No Trials Inside the
Gates of Eden": Mental Health Courts, the Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities, Dignity, and the Promise of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in
COERCIVE CARE: RIGHTS, LAW AND POLICY 193 (Bernadette McSherry & Ian
Freckelton eds., 2013).
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One of the most important developments in the past two decades in
the way that criminal defendants with mental disabilities are
treated in the criminal process has been the creation and the expansion of mental health courts, one kind of "problem-solving court."2
There are now, according to the Council of State Governments'
Justice Center, over 300 such courts in operation in the United
States, some dealing solely with misdemeanors,4 some solely with
non-violent offenders,5 and some with no such restrictions. 6 There
is a wide range of dispositional alternatives available to judes in
these cases, 7 and an even wider range of judicial attitudes. And
the entire concept of "mental health courts" is certainly not without
controversy. 9
There is no question, however, that these courts offer a new
approach - perhaps a radically new approach - to the problems at
hand. They become even more significant because of their articulated focus on dignity,' 0 as well as their embrace of therapeutic
jurisprudence, their focus on procedural justice, and their use of the
2.
See, e.g., Greg Berman & Aubrey Fox, The Future of ProblemSolving Justice: An InternationalPerspective, 10 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION,
GENDER & CLASS 1, 3 (2010); Greg Berman & John Feinblatt, Problem-Solving
Courts: A Brief Primer,23 LAW & POL'Y, 125, 127 (2001).
3.
See JUSTICE CENTER: THE COUNSEL FOR STATE GOVERNMENTS,

http://www.consensusproject.org/programs?q mental+health+court&submit=G
o (last visited Oct. 15, 2013).
4.
See, e.g., Ursula Castellano, Courting Compliance: Case Managers
as "Double Agents" in the Mental Health Court, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 484,

490 (2011).
5.
See, e.g., Julie Grachek, The Insanity Defense in the Twenty-First
Century: How Recent United States Supreme Court Case Law Can Improve the
System, 81 IND. L.J. 1479, 1495 (2006).
6.
See, e.g., E. Leah Johnston, Theorizing Mental Health Courts, 89
WASH. L. REV. 519, 521 (2012).
7.
See, e.g., Henry J. Steadman et al., From Referral to Disposition:
Case Processing in Seven Mental Health Courts, 23 BEHAV. SC. & L. 215, 220

(2005).
8.
See, e.g., Michael S. King, Should Problem-Solving Courts Be Solution-Focused Courts?, 80 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 1005 (2011).
9.
See, e.g., Tammy Seltzer, A Misguided Attempt to Address the Criminal Justice System's Unfair Treatment of People with Mental Illness, 11
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 570, 576 (2005).
10.
See Ginger Lerner Wren, Mental Health Courts: Serving Justice and
Promoting Recovery, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 577, 593 (2010) (explaining dignity in the context of mental health courts); see generally, infra text accompanying notes 79-120.
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principles of restorative justice. ''It is time to restructure the dialogue about mental health courts and to begin to take seriously the
potential ameliorative impact of such courts on the ultimate disposition of all cases involving criminal defendants with mental disabilities.
Mental health courts have come under attack from both the
right and the left. Of these attacks, I believe that the only relevant
one is that they may provide "false hope" to those who come before them. 12 I believe this is so because our "culture of blame" still
infects the entire criminal justice process, and that it continues to
demonize persons with mental illness for their status.' 3 Until this is
remediated, there can be no assurances that mental health courts or any other such potentially-ameliorative alternative - will be ultimately "successful" (however we choose to define that term).
Two issues that, however, have not been the subject of much atten11.

See Henry J. Steadman et al., Mental Health Courts: Their Promise

and Unanswered Questions, 52 LAW & PSYCHIATRY 457, 457-58 (2001) (dis-

cussing therapeutic jurisprudence in this context); Thomas L. Hafemeister,
Sharon G. Garner & Veronica E. Bath, ForgingLinks and Renewing Ties: Applying the Principles of Restorative and ProceduralJustice to Better Respond to
Criminal Offenders with a Mental Disorder, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 147, 201-02
(2012) (on procedural justice); MICHAEL L. PERLIN, A PRESCRIPTION FOR
DIGNITY: RETHINKING CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND MENTAL DISABILITY LAW 88-96

(2013) (on restorative justice). On the relationship between these three approaches, see id. at 96-98; Michael L. Perlin, Considering the "Alternative Jurisprudences" as a Tool of Social Change to Reduce Humiliation and Uphold
Dinity, "(2012),http://www.humiliationstudies.org/documents/PerlinNYI2Altern
ativeJurisprudences.pdf (paper presented to the 20th annual conference of the
Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies Network).
12. See Perlin, supra note 1, at 195, 204, 208, 210.
13.
For a consideration of the many obstacles faced by such courts, see
Kevin Daly, Chrysanti Leon & Margaret Mahoney, Delaware Mental Health
Courts' Process Evaluation: Progressive Treatment and Systematic Obstacles,
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/soL3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1584835,
http://papers.ssrn.com/soL3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1584835 (last accessed Oct.
15, 2013; see, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, "Baby, Look Inside Your Mirror": The
Legal Profession's Willful and Sanist Blindness to Lawyers with Mental Disabilities, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 606 (2008) (discussing the "culture of blame"
in a different mental disability law context and how bar committees on ethics
deal with lawyers with mental disabilities); see generally, Neil R. Feigenson,
Sympathy and Legal Judgment: A PsychologicalAnalysis, 65 TENN. L. REV. 1,
60 & n.258 (1997).
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tion must, I believe, be considered seriously: the quality of counsel
available to persons in mental health courts, and the question of
whether the individual at risk is competent to engage in mental
health court proceedings. These are both discussed extensively
below.
Much of the recent debate on mental health courts has focused either on empirical studies of recidivism or on theorization.14
These entire discussions, while important and helpful, bypass the
critical issue that is at the heart of this paper: do such courts provide additional dignity to the criminal justice process or do they
detract from that? Until we re-focus our sights on this issue, much
of the discourse on this topic remains wholly irrelevant.
In Part I of this paper, I will first discuss the underpinnings
of therapeutic jurisprudence. I will next, in Part II, look at the
structure of mental health courts, and will then raise the two concerns about such courts that are, I believe, of particular relevance
to which I just alluded: questions of adequacy of counsel and the
competency of defendants to voluntarily participate in such court
proceedings. In Part III, I will then consider the role of dignity in
this process, and look to ways that therapeutic jurisprudence can
promote dignity in this context.
The title of this paper comes, in part from Bob Dylan's
song, Drifter's Escape,'5 a song that combines revengeful elements
of the Old Testament with "a taste of Old West frontier justice." 6
The beginning of the song eerily tracks the circumstances of so
many defendants who eventually come before mental health
courts:
"Oh, help me in my weakness"
I heard the drifter say
As they carried him from the courtroom
And were taking him away
"My trip hasn't been a pleasant one
And my time it isn't long
14.

See, e.g., Richard Wiener et al., A Testable Theory of Problem Solv-

ing Courts: Past Empirical and Legal Failures, 33 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY
417 (2010).
15.
BOB DYLAN, DRIFTER'S ESCAPE (Columbia 1967).
16.

See OLIVER TRAGER, KEYS TO THE RAIN: THE DEFINITIVE BOB

DYLAN ENCYCLOPEDIA 164 (2004).
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And I still do not know
What it was that I've done wrong"
Well, the judge, he cast his robe aside
A tear came to his eye
"You fail to understand," he said
"Why must you even try?"' 7
Certainly, many such defendants have had "trips" that were
not "pleasant ones," and often "still do not know/What it was that
[they had] done wrong." The judge, in a mental health court, does
symbolically "cast his robe" aside, as his role is so radically different than it is in traditional criminal courts. But I hope, in contrast
to the situation depicted in this song, that judges do encourage litigants to "[try] to understand" the court process. Because I believe
it is then, and only then, that some sort of remediation is possible.' 8
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE'

9

One of the most important legal theoretical developments
of the past two decades has been the creation and dynamic growth
of therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ).2 0 Initially employed in cases involving individuals with mental disabilities, but subsequently expanded far beyond that narrow area, therapeutic jurisprudence pre17.

DYLAN, supra note 15.

18.
For those interested, I have seen Dylan sing this song only twice: On
May 10, 2003, at the Atlantic City (NJ) Hilton, and on August 9, 2003, in
Holmdel, NJ. He has not played it since November 27, 2005; see
http://www.bobdylan.com/us/songs/drifters-escape (last accessed, Jan. 22,
2013).
19.
Perlin, supra note 1, at 196.
20.
See, e.g., DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE
LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT (1990); DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J. WINICK,
LAW IN A THERAPEUTIC KEY: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE (1996); BRUCE J. WINICK, CIVIL COMMITMENT: A THERAPEUTIC

JURISPRUDENCE MODEL (2005); David B. Wexler, Two Decades of Therapeutic
Jurisprudence, 24 TOURO L. REV. 17 (2008); 1 MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL
DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, § 2D-3, at 534-41 (2d ed. 1998). Wexler first used the term in a paper he presented to the National Institute of Mental

Health in 1987. See David B. Wexler, Putting Mental Health into Mental
Health Law: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27, 32-33

(1992).
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sents a new model for assessing the impact of case law and legislation, recognizing that, as a therapeutic agent, the law that can have
therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences.21 The ultimate aim of
therapeutic jurisprudence is to determine whether legal rules, procedures, and lawyer roles can or should be reshaped to enhance
their therapeutic potential while not subordinating due process
principles.22 There is an inherent tension in this inquiry, but David
Wexler clearly identifies how it must be resolved: "the law's use of
'mental health information to improve therapeutic functioning
[cannot] impinge upon justice concerns."' 23 As I have written
elsewhere, "an inquiry into therapeutic outcomes does not mean
that therapeutic concerns 'trump' civil rights and civil liberties." 24
Therapeutic jurisprudence "asks us to look at law as it actually impacts people's lives," 25 and focuses on the law's influence
on emotional life and psychological well-being. 26 It suggests that
21.
See Michael L. Perlin, "His Brain Has Been Mismanaged with Great
Skill": How Will Jurors Respond to Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases?, 42 AKRON L. REV. 885, 912 (2009). See Kate Diesfeld & Tan
Freckelton, Mental Health Law and Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in DISPUTES
AND DILEMMAS IN HEALTH LAW 91 (Tan Freckelton & Kerry Anne Peterson

eds., 2006) for a transnational perspective.
22.
Michael L. Perlin, "You Have Discussed Lepers and Crooks": Sanism in Clinical Teaching, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 683 (2003); Michael L. Perlin,
"And My Best Friend, My Doctor/ Won't Even Say What It Is I've Got": The
Role and Significance of Counsel in Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 42 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 735 (2005) (Perlin, Best Friend); Michael L. Perlin, "Everybody
Is Making Love/Or Else Expecting Rain": Considering the Sexual Autonomy
Rights of Persons Institutionalized Because of Mental Disability in Forensic
Hospitals and in Asia, 83 WASH. U. L. REV. 481 (2008) (Perlin, Expecting
Rain).
23.
David B. Wexler, TherapeuticJurisprudence and ChangingConcepts
of Legal Scholarship, 11 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 17, 21 (1993).
24.
Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 407, 412
(2000) (Perlin, Healing); Michael L. Perlin, "Where the Winds Hit Heavy on
the Borderline": Mental Disability Law, Theory and Practice, "Us" and
"Them, " 31 LOY. L. REV. 775, 782 (1998).
25.
Bruce J. Winick, Foreword: Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives
on Dealing With Victims of Crime, 33 NOVA L. REV. 535, 535 (2009).
26.
David B. Wexler, Practicing Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Psychological Soft Spots and Strategies, in PRACTICING THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE:
LAW AS A HELPING PROFESSION 45 (Daniel P. Stolle, David B. Wexler & Bruce

J. Winick eds., 2000) (hereinafter

STOLLE).
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"law should value psychological health, should strive to avoid imposing anti-therapeutic consequences whenever possible, and when
consistent with other values served by law should attempt to bring
about healing and wellness."2 7 By way of example, therapeutic
jurisprudence "aims to offer social science evidence that limits the
use of the incompetency label by narrowly defining its use and
minimizing its psychological and social disadvantage." 2 8
In recent years, scholars have considered a vast range of
topics through a therapeutic jurisprudence lens, including, but not
limited to, all aspects of mental disability law, domestic relations
law, criminal law and procedure, employment law, gay rights law,
and tort law.29 As Ian Freckelton has noted, "it is a tool for gaining
a new and distinctive perspective utilizing sociopsychological insights into the law and its applications."30 It is also part of a growing comprehensive movement in the law towards establishing more
humane and psychologically optimal ways of handling legal issues
collaboratively, creatively, and respectfully. ' These alternative
approaches optimize the psychological well-being of individuals,
relationships, and communities dealing with a legal matter, and
acknowledge concerns beyond strict legal rights, duties, and obligations. In its aim to use the law to empower individuals, enhance
rights, and promote well-being, therapeutic jurisprudence has been
described as "...a sea-change in ethical thinking about the role of
law...a movement towards a more distinctly relational approach to
27.

Bruce Winick, A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Model for Civil Com-

mitment, in INVOLUNTARY

DETENTION AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE:

INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON CIVIL COMMITMENT 23, 26 (Kate Diesfeld &

Ian Freckelton eds., 2003).
28.
Claire B. Steinberger, Persistence and Change In The Life Of The
Law: Can Therapeutic Jurisprudence Make A Difference? 27 LAW & PSYCHOL.
REV. 55, 65 (2003). See also Christopher Slobogin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence:
Five Dilemmas to Ponder, I PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 193 (1995) (for the

most thoughtful, sympathetic critique of TJ).
29.
Michael L. Perlin, "Things Have Changed": Looking at AoninstitutionalMental Disability Law Through the Sanism Filter, 46 N.Y.L. ScH.

L. REV. 535 (2002-03).
30.
Ian Freckelton, Therapeutic Jurisprudence Misunderstood and Misrepresented: The Price and Risks of Influence, 30 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 575,

582 (2008).
31.
Susan Daicoff, The Role of Therapeutic Jurisprudence Within The
Comprehensive Law Movement, in STOLLE ET AL., supra note 26, at 365.

Mental Health Law & Policy Journal

8

Vol. 3

the practice of law...which emphasises psychological wellness
over adversarial triumphalism." 32 That is, therapeutic jurisprudence
supports an ethic of care.
One of the central principles of therapeutic jurisprudence is
a commitment to dignity. Prof. Amy Ronner describes the "three
Vs": voice, validation and voluntariness, 34 arguing:
What 'the three Vs' commend is pretty basic: litigants must have a sense of voice or a chance to tell
their story to a decision maker. If that litigant feels
that the tribunal has genuinely listened to, heard,
and taken seriously the litigant's story, the litigant
feels a sense of validation. When litigants emerge
from a legal proceeding with a sense of voice and
validation, they are more at peace with the outcome.
Voice and validation create a sense of voluntary
participation, one in which the litigant experiences
the proceeding as less coercive. Specifically, the
feeling on the part of litigants that they voluntarily
partook in the very process that engendered the end
result or the very judicial pronunciation that affects
their own lives can initiate healing and bring about
improved behavior in the future. In general, human
beings prosper when they feel that they are making,
or at least participating in, their own decisions.3 5
32.

Warren Brookbanks,

Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Conceiving an

Ethical Framework, 8 J.L. & MED. 328, 329-30 (2001).
33.
See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler, The Use of Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Law School ClinicalEducation: Transforming the Criminal
Law Clinic, 13 CLINICAL L. REV. 605, 605-07 (2006); David B. Wexler, Not
Such a Party Pooper: An Attempt to Accommodate (Many of) ProfessorQuinn's
Concerns about Therapeutic Jurisprudence Criminal Defense Lawyering, 48

B.C. L. REV. 597, 599 (2007); Brookbanks, supra note 32; Gregory Baker, Do
You Hear the Knocking at the Door? A "Therapeutic" Approach to Enriching
Clinical Legal Education Comes Calling,28 WHITTIER L. REV. 379, 385 (2006).
34.
Amy D. Ronner, The Learned-Helpless Lawyer: Clinical Legal Education and Therapeutic Jurisprudence as Antidotes to Bartleby Syndrome, 24
TOURO L. REV. 601, 627 (2008).
35.
Amy D. Ronner, Songs of Validation, Voice, and Voluntary Participation: Therapeutic Jurisprudence,Miranda and Juveniles, 71 U. CIN. L. REV.
89, 94-95 (2002); see generally, AMY D. RONNER, LAW, LITERATURE, AND
THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (2010).
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The question before us is this: do mental health courts promote a
vision that is consonant with the principles that Professor Ronner
sketches out for us in this paragraph?
THE STRUCTURE OF MENTAL HEALTH COURTS 36

Mental health courts-one form of "problem-solving
follow the legal theory of therapeutic jurisprudence, in

courts"3 7

36.
See generally, Bruce J. Winick, Outpatient Commitment: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 107 (2003); Susan
Stefan & Bruce J. Winick, A Dialogue on Mental Health Courts, 11 PSYCHOL.

PUB. POL'Y & L. 507 (2005). These courts are different from and independent
of traditional involuntary civil commitment courts, currently operating in many
states. For a critique of such courts, see Perlin, Healing, supra note 24, at 42526 ("[T]he overwhelming number of cases involving mental disability law issues
are 'litigated' in pitch darkness. Involuntary civil commitment cases are routinely disposed of in minutes behind closed courtroom doors."); Perlin, supra
note 1, at 209, discussing such courts that "I have observed across the nation, in
which persons with mental disabilities are regularly treated as third-class citizens by (at the best) bored or (at the worst) malevolent trial judges." For a
thoughtful reconsideration of such courts in a transnational perspective, see
Terry Carney, David Tait & Fleur Beaupert, Pushing the Boundaries: Realising
Rights Through Mental Health Tribunal Processes?, 30 SYDNEY L. REV. 329,

344 (2008).
37. Problem-solving courts grew out of an interdisciplinary approach to
address the underlying problem, not just the symptoms, of substance abuse,
domestic violence, child abuse, mental illness, and certain kinds of criminality.
See generally, Bruce J. Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudenceand Problem Solving
Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1055, 1060 (2003). For overviews, see Michael
Dorf & Jeffrey Fagan, Problem-SolvingCourts: From Innovation to Institution-

alization, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1501 (2003); Jeffrey Fagan & Victoria Malkin,
Theorizing Community Justice Through Community Courts, 30 FORDHAM URB.

L.J. 897 (2003). Included in this array are mental health courts, drug courts,
domestic violence courts, juvenile justice courts, sex offense courts, community
courts, truancy courts, veteran's courts, and homeless courts. For a full list, see
Deborah Chase & Peggy Hora, The Best Seat in the House: The Court Assignment and JudicialSatisfaction, 47 FAM. CT. REV. 209, 210 n.8 (2009). For a

critical reading on the ways that such courts "redefine" criminal justice, see
James L. Nolan, Redefining Criminal Courts: Problem-Solvingand the Meaning
of Justice, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1541 (2004). For a critical reading of the impact on child welfare cases, see Jane Spinak, A Conversation About ProblemSolving Courts: Take 2, 10 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 113

(2010).

For a consideration of an evidence-based model in one state, see

Melissa Aubin, The District of Oregon Reentry Court: An Evidence-Based
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an attempt "to improve justice by considering the therapeutic and
anti-therapeutic consequences that 'flow from substantive rules,
legal procedures, or the behavior of legal actors."38 They are designed to deal holistically 39 with people arrested (usually, but not
exclusively, for nonviolent misdemeanors) 40 when mental illness
Model, 27 FED. SENT'G. REP. 39 (2009). 1 have recently considered veterans

courts from a TJ perspective in Michael L. Perlin, "John Brown Went Off to
War": Considering Veterans' Courts as Problem-Solving Courts, 37 NOVA L.
REV. (2014).

38.
Nancy Wolff, Courts as Therapeutic Agents: Thinking Past the Novelty of Mental Health Courts, 30 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 431, 431 (2002);
see also, Randal Fritzler, How One Misdemeanor Mental Health Court Incorporates Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Preventive Law, and Restorative Justice, in
MANAGEMENT

AND

ADMINISTRATION

OF

CORRECTIONAL

HEALTH

CARE:

POLICY, PRACTICE, ADMINISTRATION 14-1, 14-3 (Jacqueline Moore ed., 2003)

("the fundamental principle underlying therapeutic jurisprudence is the selection
of options that promote health and are consistent with the values of the legal
system"). This is not a phenomenon limited to the United States. See, e.g.,
RICHARD D. SCIHNEIDER, HY BLOOM & MARK HEEREMA, MENTAL HEALTH

COURTS: DECRIMINALIZING THE MENTALLY III (2007); Sarah Ryan & Darius
Whelan, Diversion of Offenders with Mental Disorders: Mental Health Courts,
1
WEB
J.
CURR.
LEG.
ISSUES
(2012),
available
at

http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2012/issuel /ryanl.htmlhttp://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2012/issu
el/ryan1.html (Ireland); James Duffy, Problem-Solving Courts, Therapeutic
Jurisprudenceand the Constitution:If Two Is Company, Is Three a Crowd?, 35
MELB. U. L. REV. 394, 395 (2011).
39.
See Shauhin Talesh, Mental Health Court Judges as Dynamic Risk
Managers: A New Conceptualizationof the Role of Judges, 57 DEPAUL L. REV.

93, 112 (2007).
40.
Although, historically, most mental health courts typically heard only
cases of nonviolent offenders, see Grachek, supra note 5, at 1495, or only misdemeanor cases, see Castellano, supra note 4, at 490, some traditionally heard
felony cases as well, see Talesh, supra note 39, at 112. The trend is towards the

expansion of predicate case jurisdiction to include felonies, including violent
felonies, see Johnston, supra note 6, at 521. See, e.g., Andrew Wasicek, Mental
Illness and Crime: Envisioning a Public Health Strategy and Reimaging Mental
Health Courts, 48 CRIM. L. BULL. 106, 135 (2012):

Mental health courts should accept violent felonies because it
is morally unsound to punish criminal behavior that is mainly
a product of mental disease.
With appropriate eligibility criteria, the new mental health court model would
encapsulate persons who are not shielded by the insanity defense - especially
persons from post-Jones v. U.S., 463 U.S. 354 (1983) approving stringent statutory measures governing releases of persons found not guilty by reason of insan-
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rather than criminality appears to be the precipitating reason for the
behavior in question.41 The mental health court judge42 seeks to
divert the individual from the criminal court in exchange for an
agreement to participate in community treatment,4 3 and to "help
participants avoid future criminal court involvement." 4 4
ity era, see 4 PERLIN, supra note 20,

§ 9B-2.3, at 290-98 (2d ed. 2002)]-

but

should still be held blameless.
41.
See generally, Stefan & Winick, supra note 36, relying on, inter alia,
Fritzler, supra note 38; Arthur Lurigio et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence in Action: Specialized Courts for the Mentally Ill, 84 JUDICATURE 184 (2001); John
Petrila et al., Preliminary Observations from an Evaluation of the Broward
County Mental Health Court, 37 CT. REV. 14 (2002); Jan Freckelton, Mental
Health Review Tribunal Decision-making: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Lens,
10 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 44 (2003); see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE
ASSISTANCE, MENTAL HEALTH COURTS: A PRIMER FOR POLICYMAKERS AND
PRACTITIONERS (2008). Positive and negative arguments about mental health

courts are collected in Andrea M. Odegaard, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: The
Impact of Mental Health Courts on the Criminal Justice System, 83 N.D. L.

REV. 225, 250-54 (2007); see generally, Arthur J. Lurigio & Jessica Snowden,
Putting Therapeutic Jurisprudenceinto Practice: The Growth, Operations,and
Effectiveness of Mental Health Court, 30 JUST. SYS. J. 196 (2009).

42. Judges are the most common referral source of participants into diversion programs (100% of survey respondents), with mental health personnel
(93% of survey respondents) coming in second, and attorneys (90% of survey

respondents) coming in a close third. For those agencies that chose the "other"
category, they indicated that referrals could come from families, service providers, law enforcement personnel, community agencies, and parole officers. Julie
B. Raines & Glenn T. Laws, Mental Health Court Survey, 45 CRIM. L. BULL.

627, 632 (2009).
43.
Marjorie A. Silver, Lawyering and Its Discontents: Reclaiming
Meaning in the Practice of Law, 19 TOURO L. REV. 773, 803 (2004); see also
Talesh, supra note 39, at 110; Camille Nelson, Racializing Disability, Disabling
Race: Policing Race and Mental Status, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 2 (2010)

(on the necessity of diversion); John Cummings, The Cost of Crazy: How
Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Mental Health Courts Lower Incarceration
Costs, Reduce Recidivism, and Improve Public Safety, 56 LoY. L. REV. 279, 306

(2010) (discussing mental health courts' "palpable results"). On the question of
whether this diversion is swifter than traditional court processing, see Allison
Redlich et al., Is Diversion Swift: Comparing Mental Health Court and Traditional CriminalJustice Processing, 39 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 420 (2012) (al-

though diversion may not be swifter, that may be less important than the fact of
diversion itself).
44.
IDAHO

Kirk Kimber, Mental Health Courts - Idaho's Best Kept Secret, 45

L. REV. 249, 270 (2008); see also, Brenda Desmond & Paul Lenz, Men-
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Mental health courts are premised on team approaches; 45
representatives from justice and treatment agencies assist the judge
in screening offenders to determine whether they would present a
risk of violence if released to the community, in devising appropriate treatment plans, and in supervising and monitoring the individual's performance in treatment.4 6 The mental health court judge
functions as part of a mental health team that decides whether the
individual has treatment needs and can be safely released to the
community. 47 The team formulates a treatment plan, and a courtemployed case manager and court monitor track the individual's
participation in the treatment program, and submit periodic reports
to the judge concerning his or her progress. Participants are required to report to the court periodically so that the judge can
monitor treatment compliance, and additional status review hear48
ings are held on an as-needed basis.
To serve effectively in this sort of court setting, the judge
needs to develop enhanced interpersonal skills and awareness of a
variety of psychological techniques that can help the judge to persuade the individual to accept treatment and motivate him or her to
participate effectively in it. 49 She must be able to build trust and
tal Health Courts: An Effective Way of Treating Offenders with Serious Mental
Illness, 34 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 525, 526 (2010). On the

creation of juvenile mental health courts, see Daniel M. Filler & Austin Smith,
The New Rehabilitation,91 IOWA L. REV. 951, 971 n. 105 (2006).
45. See e.g., Lurigio & Snowden, supra note 41, at 210; Marlee E.
Moore & Virginia A. Hiday, Mental Health Court Outcomes: A Comparison of
Re-arrest and Re-arrest Severity Between Mental Health Court and Traditional
Court Participants,30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 659, 660 (2006).

46. Winick, supra note 36, at 125-26. On the role of jail as a potential
sanction in the cases of non-compliant defendants, see Allison Redlich et al.,
Patterns and Practice in Mental Health Courts: A National Survey, 30 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 347, 355-56 (2006).
47.
On the often-conflicting roles of case managers in mental health

courts, see Castellano,supra note 4, at 490-91.
48.
Stefan & Winick, supra note 36, at 520-21.
49. Winick, supra note 36, at 126 (citing Carrie Petrucci, Respect as a
Component in the Judge-Defendant Interaction in a Specialized Domestic Violence Court that Utilizes Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 38 CRIM. L. BULL. 263

(2002)). On the "collateral institutional authority of the judge" in mental health
courts, see Eric J. Miller, The Therapeutic Effects of Managerial Re-entry
Courts, 30 FED. SENT'G REP. 127, 128 (2008). On the way that judgmental de-

scriptive language can adversely affect the work of such courts in civil cases, see
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manage risk.5 0 These skills include the ability to convey empathy
and respect, to communicate effectively with the individual, to listen to what the individual has to say, thereby fulfilling the individual's need for voice and validation, to earn the individual's trust
and confidence, and to engage in motivational interviewing and
various other techniques designed to encourage the individual to
accept treatment and comply with it.5 1
These courts provide "nuanced" approaches, 52 and may
signal a "fundamental shift" in the criminal justice system.53 According to former Judge Randal Fritzler, a successful mental health
court thus needs: 1) a therapeutic environment and dedicated team;
2) an environment free from stigmatizing labels; 3) opportunities
for deferred sentences and diversion away from the criminal system; 4) the least restrictive alternatives; 5) decision-making that is
interdependent; 6) coordinated treatment; and 7) a review process
that is meaningful.5 4 It is essential that such courts be free of the
"pretextual dishonesty" 55 that is so often the hallmark of judicial
proceedings in cases of individuals with mental disabilities. 56
Ian Freckelton, Distractors and Distressors in Involuntary Status DecisionMaking, 12 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L . 88 (2005).
50.
Carol Fisler, Building Trust and Managing Risk: A Look at a Felony
Mental Health Court, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 587 (2005).

51.
For a thoughtful critique of mental health courts, see Johnston, supra
note 6. On the role of the legislature in ensuring the success of such courts, see
Sheila Moheb, Jamming the Revolving Door: Legislative Setbacks for Mental
Health Court Systems in Virginia, 14 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 29 (2010).
52.
Patricia C. McManus, A Therapeutic JurisprudentialApproach to
Guardianship of Persons with Mild Cognitive Impairment, 36 SETON HALL L.
REV. 591, 598 (2006).
53.
Developments in the Law -The
Law of Mental Illness: Mental
Health Courts and the Trend Toward a Rehabilitative Justice System, 121
HARV.L.REV. 1168, 1177 (2008).
54.
Randal B. Fritzler, 10 Key Components of a Criminal Mental Health
Court, reprinted in

JUDGING

IN

A

THERAPEUTIC

KEY:

THERAPEUTIC

JURISPRUDENCE AND THE COURTS 118 (Bruce J. Winick & David B. Wexler

eds., 2003), and Fritzler, supra note 38, at 14-18 ("The [mental health court]
must avoid contributing negative stigma to its clients"). See also Georgia Lee
Sims, The Criminalization of Mental Illness: How Theoretical Failures Create
Real Problems in the Criminal Justice System, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1053, 1079

(2009).
55.
1 define "pretextuality" as the ways in which courts accept (either
implicitly or explicitly) testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly in dishonest
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Some defense attorneys fear that problem-solving courts, in
general, "arm twist ... [their clients] into diversion with a condi-

tion of entry being that they take a plea, and/or that the effective
treatment is raised above the least restrictive treatment.5 7 By way
of example, Cait Clarke and James Neuhard raise this potential
dilemma:
For example, a defense attorney may devote less attention to the desires of the defendant, focusing
more on the goals of the 'team' (including the defense attorney, prosecutor, judge, and probation officer). An illustration of this would be where the
'team' decides the defendant requires in-custody
treatment, although the defendant has previously
told the defense attorney that she does not want to
participate in an in-custody treatment program.5 8
Skeptics argue that MHCs are too dependent on the aura of
the charismatic judge. 59 However, we do have a database of research on the way that persons whose cases have been heard before
one MHC, the one run by Judge Ginger Lerner-Wren in Ft. Lauderdale, FL and that database is spectacular. 6 0 Basically, it tells us
(and frequently meretricious) decision-making. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin,
"Simplify You, Classify You": Stigma, Stereotypes and Civil Rights in Disability
ClassificationSystems, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 607, 621 (2009).
56.
See, e.g., Jan Freckelton, Mental Health Review Tribunal Decisionmaking: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Lens, 10 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 44,
59 (2003) (citing Michael L. Perlin, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL
DISABILITY ON TRIAL (2000)); Michael L. Perlin, Preface to INVOLUNTARY
DETENTION AND THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES

ON CIVIL COMMITMENT xxxiii (Kate Diesfeld & Ian Freckelton eds., 2003); Ian
Freckelton, Ideological Divaricationin Civil Commitment Decision-making, 10
PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 390, 395 (2003).
57.
Cait Clarke & James Neuhard, "From Day One ": Who's in Control
as Problem Solving and Client-Centered Sentencing Take Center Stage?, 29
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 11, 29 (2004).

58.
59.

Clarke & Neuhard, supra note 57, at 29 n.49.
A caution on relying on such charisma in the context of other prob-

lem solving courts is raised in Jane Spinak, Romancing the Court, 46 FAM. CT.

REV. 258, 269-71(2008).
60.
On the difficulties generally in assessing mental health courts, see
Nancy Wolff & Wendy Pogorzelski, Measuring the Effectiveness of Mental
Health Courts, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 539 (2005).
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that defendants before Judge Lerner-Wren report a higher score on
a dignity scale (and a lower score on a perceived coercion scale) 6 1
than any group of criminal defendants who have ever been studi62 In short, the actual, real life experiences of the litigants in
ied.
cases before Judge Lerner-Wren demonstrate that one MHC can be
a non-coercive, dignified experience that provides procedural justice and therapeutic jurisprudence to those before it. 63

61.
On the role of therapeutic jurisprudence in dealing with coercion in
the mental health court process, see Bruce Winick, A TherapeuticJurisprudence
Approach to Dealing with Coercion in the Mental Health System, 15
PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 25 (2008). On the significance of the presence of

dignity in mental health tribunals in Australia, see David Tait, The Ritual Environment of the Mental Health Tribunal Hearing: Inquiries and Reflections, 10
PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 91 (2003). On dignitiarian issues in general, see
PERLIN, supra note 11, at 99-108.
62.
See Norman G. Poythress et al., Perceived Coercion and Procedural
Justice in the Broward Mental Health Court, 25 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 517

(2002). Judge Wren discusses her judicial philosophy in Wren, supra note 10.
On how levels of emotional intelligence correlate with judicial success in problem-solving courts, see James Duffy, Problem-Solving Courts, Therapeutic
Jurisprudenceand the Constitution, 35 MELB. U. L. REV. 394 (2011); Michael
King, Restorative Justice, Therapeutic Jurisprudence,and the Rise of the Emotionally IntelligentJustice, 35 MELB. L. REV. 1096 (2008). On the role of restorative justice, see generally PERLIN, supra note 11, at 88-96, in problem-

solving courts, see Megan Stephens, Lessons from the Front Lines in Canada's
Restorative Justice Experiment: The Experience of Sentencing Judges, 33

L.J. 19, 63-64 (2007).
63.
See Judith Kaye, Lecture 81 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 743, 748 (2007)
("[M]ental health courts, which . . . divert defendants from jail to treatment,
reconnect them, where possible, with family and friends who care whether they
QUEEN'S

live or die,

. .

. restore their greatest loss-their sense of human dignity") (author

former Chief Judge of New York Court of Appeals); Hafemeister, Garner &
Bath, supra note 11, at 201-02 ("[P]rocedural justice is a key to the success of
mental health courts"). For a less sanguine attitude (based on a visit to a mental
health court in Washington, D.C.), see Allegra M. McLeod, Decarceration
Courts: Possibilitiesand Perils of a Shifting Criminal Law, 100 GEo L.J. 1587,
1613-14 (2012) ("[A]ctual therapeutic or other effects of this engagement remain uncertain"). On the important related issue of the impact of such courts on
racial and ethnic minorities, see Robert V. Wolf, Race, Bias, and ProblemSolving Courts, 21 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 27, 46-47 (2009) (research by National
Center for State Courts reveals that African-Americans and Latinos show more
support for practices and procedures promoted by problem-solving courts than
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Two Concerns
I do have two concerns that have not been the focus of
much scholarly attention. It is these two concerns that temper my
full enthusiasm for mental health courts, especially in the context
of the issues I focus on in this paper, but I believe that they can be
remediated: the lack of concern paid to the question of competency
in the mental health court process, 64 and the lack of concern paid to
the question of the quality of counsel made available to individuals
in the mental health court process.
Dr. Steven Erickson and his colleagues point out what
should be obvious: Given the impaired cognition that accompanies
many mental disorders, "there is little evidence to suggest that
mental health courts ensure that prospective candidates are competent to accept [the] plea bargains [into which many enter], as required by constitutional law." 65 Allison Redlich similarly worries
that "the very types of people MHCs were designed for may be the
people who do not fully comprehend the purpose, requirements,
and roles in the courts." 66 Subsequent research done by Redlich
and her colleagues, in fact, reveals that the majority of defendants
at two mental courts lacked "nuanced information" about the trial
do whites). On the impact of such courts on immigrants, see Alina Das, Immigrants and Problem-SolvingCourts, 33 CRIM. JUST. REV. 308 (2008).
64.
See generally, Kathleen Stafford & Dustin Wygant, The Role of
Competency to Stand Trial in Mental Health Courts, 23 BEHAV. SC. & L. 245

(2005) (over three-quarters of potential mental health court defendants in one
Ohio court were found to be incompetent).
65.
Steven Erickson et al., Variations in Mental Health Courts: Challenges, Opportunities, and a Call for Caution, 42 COMM. MENTAL HEALTH J.
335, 339 (2006); see also Stacey M. Faraci, Slip Slidin' Away? Will Our Nation's Mental Health Court Experiment Diminish the Rights of the Mentally Ill?,
22 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 811, 828-29 (2004) ("[O]ne of the first orders of business is to determine whether the individual is competent . . . '[E]ven among

those deemed competent to stand trial, serious questions may be raised about the
ability of persons to truly understand the choices being presented and the consequences of those choices"'), quoting John S. Goldkamp & Cheryl Irons-Guynn,
Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Emerging Judicial Strategies For the Mentally Ill in the Criminal Caseload: Mental Health Courts in
Fort Lauderdale, Seattle, San Bernardino, and Anchorage xi (Apr. 2000), avail-

able at http:// www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/bja/I 82504.pdf.
66.
Allison Redlich, Voluntary, But Knowing and Intelligent?, 11
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 605, 616 (2005).
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process and that a minority of defendants had "impairments in legal competence"; 67 the researchers concluded, however, that there
were some indications that "the clients in the [mental health courts]
in this study made knowing, intelligent and voluntary enrollment
decisions."68 Clearly, "a thorough evaluation of the offender's
mental competence ... is essential" in the mental health court proc-

ess. 69 Judge Michael Finkle and several colleagues have recommended that "competency courts" be created as subspecialty courts
within mental health courts to "improve the competency process
and reduce the unnecessary time that mentally ill persons spend in
jail,"7 0 but there are no signs that this recommendation is being
acted upon.
What about counsel? I have written often about the scandalous lack of effective counsel made available to persons with
mental disabilities in the civil commitment and criminal justice
processes. 7 What is the quality of counsel available to litigants in
mental health courts?
67.
Allison Redlich et al., Enrollment in Mental Health Courts: Voluntariness, Knowingness, and Adjudicative Incompetence, 34 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 91, 91 (2010).

68.

Id. at 101. On the other hand, they noted:
[I]ndividuals making important legal and treatment decisions
should have more than a basic knowledge of procedures, requirements, and consequences, particularly given that there are
sanctions for non-compliance. Thus, MHCs must now ask:
What information do we want MHC participants to have at the
time of enrollment and how can we ensure that the information is meaningfully understood, particularly the complicated
nuances?
Id. at 103.
69.
Christin E. Keele, Criminalizationof the Mentally Ill: The Challenging Role of the Defense Attorney in the Mental Health Court System, 71 UMKC
L. REV. 193, 202 (2002).
70.
Michael J. Finkle et al., Competency Courts: A Creative Solution for
Restoring Competency to the Competency Process, 27 BEHAV. SC. & L. 767

(2009). However, with the exception of one student note, see Nicholas Rosinia,
How 'Reasonable' Has Become Unreasonable: A Proposalfor Rewriting the
Lasting Legacy of Jackson v. Indiana, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 673, 693 n.115

(2012), this suggestion has heretofore gone unnoticed in the legal literature.
71.
See Michael L. Perlin, "IMight Need a Good Lawyer, Could Be Your
Funeral, My Trial": A Global Perspective on the Right to Counsel in Civil
Commitment Cases, and Its Implications for Clinical Legal Education, 28
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Dr. Steven Erickson and his colleagues have expressed
concern "as to whether defendants in mental health courts receive
adequate representation by their attorneys." 72 Terry Carney characterizes the assumption that adequate counsel will be present at
hearings to guarantee liberty values as a "false hope."73 Henry
Dlugacz and Christopher Wimmer summarize the salient issues:
It is not reasonable to expect a client to repose trust
in an attorney unless she is confident that he is acting in accordance with her wishes. The client with
mental illness may already doubt the attorney's loyalty. This risk is exacerbated when the attorney is
appointed by the court. The client may wonder
whether the attorney has been assigned in order to
zealously represent her, or instead to facilitate her
processing through the legal system . .

.

. There are

strong personal disincentives to thorough preparation, even for the committed attorney. There are
also institutional pressures: The attorney who depends on the goodwill of others in the system (e.g.,
WASH. U. J. L. & SOC'L POL'Y 241, 241 (2008) ("If there has been any constant
in modern mental disability law in its thirty-five-year history, it is the nearuniversal reality that counsel assigned to represent individuals at involuntary
civil commitment cases is likely to be ineffective"); Michael L. Perlin, "The
Executioner's Face Is Always Well-Hidden": The Role of Counsel and the
Courts in Determining Who Dies, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 201, 207-08 (1996)

("Nearly twenty years ago, when surveying the availability of counsel to mentally disabled litigants, President Carter's Commission on Mental Health noted
the frequently substandard level of representation made available to mentally
disabled criminal defendants. Nothing that has happened in the past two decades
has been a palliative for this problem"). See generally, MICHAEL L. PERLIN,
MENTAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH PENALTY: THE SHAME OF THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 123-38 (2013).

72. Erickson et al., supra note 65, at 340.
73.
Terry Carney, The Mental Health Service Crisis of Aeoliberalism An Antipodean Perspective, 31 INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 101, 111 (2008). See
also Terry Carney, Best Interests or Legal Rectitude? Australian Mental Health
Tribunal Stakeholder & Case Flow Implications (paper presented at Irish Mental Health Commission Conference 'Mental Health Act 2001-Promoting Best
Interest, ' Dublin, November 2009), manuscript at 33 ("The issue of legal advocacy before [mental health tribunals] is a vexed one.") (paper on file with
author). See also Perlin, supra note 37 (discussing this same issue in the context
of veterans courts).
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judges, state attorneys, or prosecutors) may pull his
punches, even unwittingly, in order to retain credibility for future interactions (which he would put to
use for his future clients). Judges want cases resolved.74
Some solutions have been offered. Bruce Winick has argued that "lawyers should adequately counsel their clients about
the advantages and disadvantages of accepting diversion to mental
health court." 7 5 As a result, judges and defense counsel in mental
health courts should ensure that defendants receive dignity and
respect, are given a sense of voice and validation, and are treated
with fairness and good faith." 76 Turning to the legal education
clinical context, David Wexler has suggested that students might
"consider the kind of dialogue a lawyer might have with a client
about the pros and cons of opting into a [drug treatment court] or
mental health court."77 It is essential that counsel has "a back74.
Henry A. Dlugacz & Christopher Wimmer, The Ethics of Representing Clients with Limited Competency in GuardianshipProceedings,4 ST. Louis

U. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 331, 353-54 (2011). On the need for lawyers taking a
TJ approach to view their clients "holistically," see King, supra note 63, at
1122.
75.
Stefan & Winick, supra note 36, at 523.
76.
Id at 516. See also Winick, supra note 36; Stefan & Winick, supra
note 36, at 510-11, 520 (comments by Professor Winick).
77.
David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Rehabilitative
Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 743, 750 (2005).
See Cait Clarke & James Neuhard, Making the Case: TherapeuticJurisprudence
and Problem Solving Practices Positively Impact Clients, Justice Systems and
Communities They Serve, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 781, 807 (2005) (discussing

the role of therapeutic jurisprudence in clinical legal education). I consider dialogues that defense lawyers might have with their clients in incompetency status
or insanity defense cases in Michael L. Perlin, "Too Stubborn To Ever Be Governed By Enforced Insanity": Some Therapeutic JurisprudenceDilemmas in the
Representation of Criminal Defendants in Incompetency and Insanity Cases, 33
INT'L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 475 (2010). On the parallel set of issues raised in the

context of drug courts, compare David B. Wexler, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 743,
750 (2005), see Clarke & Neuhard, supra note 57, at 29 (considering a parallel
set of issues in drug courts) ("In addition to concerns about net-widening, some
defense attorneys fear that these courts and the defense attorneys who practice in
them are forcing their clients into the drug courts, arm twisting them into diversion with a condition of entry being that they take a plea, and/or that the effective treatment is raised above the least restrictive treatment"); see generally,
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ground in mental health issues and in communicating with individuals who may be in crisis."
ON DIGNITY 79
Introduction
Dignity is at the core of therapeutic jurisprudence,8 0 and it
also is the key underpinning of mental health courts. 8 Prof. Carol
Sanger suggests that dignity means that people "possess an intrinsic worth that should be recognized and respected," and that they
should not be subjected to treatment by the state that is inconsistent
with that intrinsic worth. 82 Treating people with dignity and respect
makes them more likely to view procedures as fair and the motives
Mae C. Quinn, Whose Team Am I on Anyway: Musings of a Public Defender
about Drug Treatment Court Practice, 26 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 37

(2001). For an overview of drug courts, see also Peggy Hora & Theodore Stalcup, Drug Treatment Courts in the Twenty-First Century: The Evolution of the
Revolution in Problem-Solving Courts, 42 GA. L. REV. 717 (2008). For a recent

article by sitting trial judges contrasting mental health courts and drug courts,
see Anne Harper & Michael J. Finkle, Mental Health Courts, 51 JUDGES' J. 4

(2012). For a critique of juvenile drug courts, see Jason Rayne, An Exposition of
the Effectiveness of and the Challenges Plaguing Maine's Juvenile Drug Treat-

ment Court Program,62 ME. L. REV. 649 (2010). For a consideration of family
drug courts, see Janet York et al., Family Drug Treatment Courts and Social
Determinants of Health, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 137 (2012). On the question as to

whether drug courts should be operated as civil rather than criminal courts, see
Alex Kreit, The DecriminalizationOption: Should States Consider Moving from
a Criminal to a Civil Drug Court Model?, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 299 (2010).

78.
79.

Wexler, supra note 77, at 750.
See generally, Perlin, supra note 11, at 99-108 & 217-39; Michael L.

Perlin, Understandingthe Intersection between InternationalHuman Rights and
Mental Disability Law: The Role of Dignity, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIME AND JUSTICE STUDIES 191 (Bruce Arrigo & Heather

Bersot, eds., 2013).
80.
See Christina A. Zawisza & Adela Beckerman, Two Heads Are Better
Than One: The Case-Based Rationalefor Dual Disciplinary Teaching in Child
Advocacy Clinics, 7 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 631 (2006); David C. Yamada, Human Dignity and American Employment Law, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 523 (2009).

81.
Perlin, supra note 1, at 209 (relying on, inter alia, Poythress et al.,
supra note 62).
82.
Carol Sanger, Decisional Dignity: Teenage Abortion, Bypass Hearings, and the Misuse of Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 409, 415 (2009).
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behind law enforcement's actions as well meaning.13 What individuals want most "is a process that allows them to participate,
seeks to merit their trust, and treats them with dignity and respect."84 All concepts of human rights have their basis in some
understanding of human dignity.8 5 Dignity has been characterized
as one of "those very great political values that defines our constitutional morality." 86
The legal process upholds human dignity by allowing the
litigant-including the criminal defendant-to tell his own story.
A notion of individual dignity, "generally articulated through concepts of autonomy, respect, equality, and freedom from undue
government interference, was at the heart of a jurisprudential and
moral outlook that resulted in the reform, not only of criminal procedure, but of the various institutions more or less directly linked
with the criminal justice system, including juvenile courts, prisons,
and mental institutions."88 Fair process norms such as the right to
counsel "operate as substantive and procedural restraints on state
power to ensure that the individual suspect is treated with dignity
and respect." 89 Dignity concepts are expansive; a Canadian Supreme Court case has declared that disenfranchisement of incarcerated persons violated their dignity interests. 90 By way of example,
83.

Tamar R. Birckhead, Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice for

Juveniles, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1447, 1474 (2009).

84.

Luther Munford, The Peacemaker Test: Designing Legal Rights to

Reduce Legal Warfare, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 377, 393 (2007).

85.
Buddhism and Human Dignity, SGI QUARTERLY, (July 2000) available at http://www.sgi.org/buddhism/buddhist-concepts/buddhism-and-humandignity.html.
86.
William A. Parent, Constitutional Values and Human Dignity, in THE
CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 47, 71

(Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992).
87.
Katherine Kruse, The Human Dignity of Clients, 93 CORNELL L. REV.
1343, 1353 (2008).
88.
Eric Miller, Embracing Addiction: Drug Courts and the False Promise ofJudicialInterventionism, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1479, 1569 n.463 (2004).
89.
Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The
Warren and Burger Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 200
(1983).
90.
Sauv6 v. Canada, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519, discussed in Michael Pinard,
Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race
and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 464 (2010).
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"the moral dignity of the criminal process would be frustrated if
grossly incompetent defendants were permitted to plead guilty." 91
One of the critical functions of counsel is to "protect the dignity
and autonomy of a person on trial."9 2 Perhaps counterintuitively to
much of the lay public, dignity may trump "truth" as a core value
of the criminal justice system. 93 In short, dignity inquiries permeate the criminal justice system, especially as the concept applies to
persons with mental disabilities.
Dignity must also be contextualized with what I call "sanism" and "pretextuality." Sanism is an irrational prejudice of the
same quality and character of other irrational prejudices that cause,
and are reflected in, prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism,
homophobia, and ethnic bigotry. 94 It permeates mental disability
law, affecting all participants in the mental disability law system:
litigants, fact-finders, counsel, and expert and lay witnesses. Its
corrosive effects have warped mental disability law jurisprudence. 9 5 Along with pretextuality, 96 it has controlled, and continues
91.

Bruce J. Winick, Reforming Incompetency to Stand Trial and Plead

Guilty: A Restated Proposal and a Response to ProfessorBonnie, 85 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 571, 593 (1995).

92.

Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 759 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

See also, e.g., Philip Halpern, Government Intrusion into the Attorney-Client
Relationship: An Interest Analysis of Rights and Remedies, 32 BUFF. L. REV.

127, 172 (1983) ("The right to counsel embraces two separate interests: reliable
and fair determinations in criminal proceedings, and treatment of defendants
with dignity and respect regardless of the effect on the outcome of criminal proceedings.").
93.

Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO

L. Rv. 1, 52 (2010). On the application of human dignity principles to limit the
scope of criminalization of victimless crimes (specifically, drug offenses), see
generally, Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Drugs, Dignity, and Danger: Human
Dignity as a Constitutional Constraintto Limit Overcriminalization,80 TENN.
L. REV. 291 (2013).

94. Perlin, Expecting Rain supra note 22, at 506.
95.
Id. at 487.
96. See supra note 55. See generally, Michael L. Perlin, "Half-Wracked
Prejudice Leaped Forth": Sanism, Pretextuality, and Why and How Mental
Disability Law Developed as It Did, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 3, 18 (1999)

(footnotes omitted):
The pretexts of the forensic mental health system are reflected
both in the testimony of forensic experts and in the decisions of
legislators and fact-finders. Experts frequently testify in accor-
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to control, modern mental disability law. 97 A careful examination
of mental disability law reveals that judges are often pretextual
because of their own "instrumental, functional, normative and philosophical" dissatisfaction with non-sanist constitutional decisions
that grant a measure of dignity to persons with mental disabilities. 98
I believe that therapeutic jurisprudence is the best tool
available to us to infuse the legal process with needed dignity. 99
The expanded use of dignity-providing mental health courts would
allow for diversion of more of this cohort of defendants out of the
criminal court process (and ultimately, out of destructive correctional facilities) into alternative placements where it is more likely
they will be treated with at least a modicum of dignity.' 00

dance with their own self-referential concepts of 'morality' and
openly subvert statutory and case law criteria that impose rigorous behavioral standards as predicates for commitment or that
articulate functional standards as prerequisites for an incompetency to stand trial finding. Often this testimony is further
warped by a heuristic bias. Expert witnesses-like the rest of
us-succumb to the seductive allure of simplifying cognitive
devices in their thinking, and employ such heuristic gambits as
the vividness effect or attribution theory in their testimony.
Id. at 18.
97.
Michael L. Perlin, Promoting Social Change in Asia and the Pacific:
The Need for a Disability Rights Tribunal to Give Life to the U.N. Convention
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,44 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 1, 31

(2012).
98.

Michael L. Perlin, "Life Is In Mirrors, Death Disappears": Giving

Life to Atkins, 33 N.M. L. REV. 315, 344 (2003) (quoting, in part, Michael L.
Perlin, "There's No Success Like Failure/andFailure'sNo Success at All" Exposing the Pretextuality of Kansas v. Hendricks, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 1247, 1258

(1997)).
99.

Keri K. Gould & Michael L. Perlin, "Johnny's in the Base-

ment/Mixing Up His Medicine ": Therapeutic Jurisprudenceand Clinical Teaching, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 339, 354 n.93 (2000) ("Therapeutic jurisprudence

may also lend dignity to the voice of persons subordinated even by those who
profess to represent the powerless."); Perlin, supra note 11, at 217-39.
100.
"The purpose of the mental health court is to insure that mentally ill
people are treated with dignity and provided with the opportunity for treatment
while at the same time protecting the public's safety" and "preventing criminalization of the mentally ill." See Faraci,supra note 65, at 824.
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The arbitrary limitation in some mental health courts cutting off eligibility either for persons who are charged with committing felonies or crimes of "violence"' 0 ' self-evidently greatly limits
the cohort of individuals who can be diverted to such courts.' 02
Absent any empirical justification for these limitations - and none
has been offered' 0 3 _ it makes no sense to perpetuate these cut
offs,10 4 especially in the context of the vast discretion traditionally
vested in prosecutors with regards to the charging process.'os
To a great extent, prosecutors' decisions follow the initial
judgments of police officers. But the near-boundless discretion
vested in police decision-making makes this counterproductive. By
way of example, consider the factual settings in the Supreme Court
cases of Addington v. Texas' 06 and Jones v. United States.' 07
101.
See Grachek, supra note 5, at 1495; Castellano, supra note 4, at 490.
Misdemeanors are accepted by 87% of mental health courts responding to a
recent survey; 77% of such courts accept non-violent felonies, and over onethird of the courts accept violent felonies. Raines & Laws, supra note 42, at
630.
102.
One rarely-discussed but powerfully-important issue is that of
"clutchability," a consideration of "when the state has legitimate hold or power
over an individual." On the concept of "clutchability" in general in criminal
law, see, e.g., Joel Feinberg, Crime, Clutchability, and Individuated Treatment,
in DOING & DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RESPONSIBILITY 252

(1970). On the concept in this context of mental health courts, see Chelsea
Davis, With the Best of Intentions, 3 MENTAL HEALTH L. & POL'Y J. 101 (2013).
103.
The rationale appears to be purely political: "Violent offenders have
traditionally been excluded from mental health courts because of public outcry
to the heinous nature of their crimes vis-a-vis the public's empathetic perception
of mentally ill, nonviolent offenders." Jared Hodges & Brett Williams, Courts,
28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 293, 303 (2011) (emphasis added). Of course, not all
felonies are remotely "heinous." See infra notes 106-11 accompanying text.
104.
See Wasicek, supra note 40, at 139 ("Mental health courts should
accept [cases of defendants charged with] violent felonies").
105.
See, e.g., Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of
ProsecutorialDiscretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2 (1971); Conor Clark & Austin
Sarat, Beyond Discretion: Prosecution, the Logic of Sovereignty, and the Limits
of Law, 33 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 387, 389 (2008).

106.
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (burden of proof in civil
commitment case at least "clear and convincing evidence").
107.
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983) (constitutionally acceptable to provide insanity acquittees with fewer procedural due process protections
in a retention hearing than civil committees).
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Addington, who was subjected to the involuntary civil commitment process, had originally been apprehended following an alleged "assault by threat" on his mother.' 08 Jones, for whom an insanity defense plea had been entered, had originally been apprehended after he allegedly attempted to shoplift a jacket in a downtown Washington, D.C. department store.109 Addington's acts appear to have been more serious (and more "dangerous") than did
Jones's; yet, for undisclosed and unarticulated extra-judicial reasons, Addington was brought into the mental health system while
Jones was arrested and thus brought into the criminal justice system.' 10 Notwithstanding the fact that Jones was charged with a felony (attempted petit larceny [shoplifting]), it makes no sense to
suggest that this was the sort of "heinous" crime that would automatically disallow diversion to a mental health court."'
Scholars and practitioners who have written about mental
health courts frequently stress the need for "creativity" in the use
of such courts as a tool for enhancing the decision to divert a defendant from traditional criminal court.112 In such courts, judges
must seek to craft "creative judicial responses to offending conduct
that address the root causes of that conduct in the hope that, in the
end, the prevalence of such conduct will subside."'" 3 An expansion
of these courts will best serve the population under consideration
in this work. Consider here the thoughts of Gerald Nora, an Illinois
state's attorney:

108.

Addington, 441 U.S. at 420.

109.
Jones, 463 U.S. at 359.
110.
1discuss the implications of this in Perlin, supra note 96, at 30 n.158.
111.
Id. at 29-30 ("Untrammeled discretion vested in police officers leads
to inexplicable disjunctions in mental disability law developments.").
112.
See, e.g., Clarke & Neuhard, supra note 77, at 781 (on how "creative"
advocacy can achieve diversion or alternatives to incarceration in this context);
Sandra F. Cannon & Joseph Krake, Mental Health Diversion Alternatives to
Jail: Thirteen Pilot ProgramsFunded by ODMH in April 2000: Where Are They
Now and What Have We Learned?, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 1021, 1027 (2004) ("Di-

version programs that pool resources from different systems-mental health,
substance abuse and criminal justice-and those that utilize creative strategies to
approach housing and other treatment issues will undoubtedly fare the best").
113.
Raymond H. Brescia, Beyond Balls and Strikes: Towards a ProblemSolving Ethic in Foreclosure Proceedings, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 305, 315
(2009).
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The bottom line is that mental health courts are heroic efforts to bring some justice to a severely underserved population. It is society's failure, not the
criminal justice system's failure, if these courts continue to be the brightest candles in the darkness we
have imposed upon the mentally ill. We are prosecuting the mentally ill as criminals. And many mental health workers are prevented from doing their
jobs unless they are partnered with lawyers, probation officers, and court orders. And our preferred
patients are those who commit crimes. We let the
law-abiding suffer alone."14
Nora's indictment is a powerful one: "If we persist in prosecuting
mentally ill defendants in willful ignorance of their medical problems, our system will stand as an asylum whose keepers are as deluded as the inmates."" 5 The expansion of mental health courts following the models of Judge Wren,'6 Judge Matthew D'Emic,
Judge Michael Finkle," 8 and others" 9 - is a major component in
the prescription of dignity for this population, and, importantly, as
** *
*120
a way to minimize sanism.
114.
Gerald Nora, Prosecutor as "Nurse Ratched"? Misusing Criminal
Justice as Alternative Medicine, 22 CRIM. JUST. 18, 22 (Fall 2007).
115.
Id.

116.
See Wren, supra note 10, at 593 (explaining dignity in the context of
mental health courts).
117.

See Matthew J. D'Emic, The Promise of Mental Health Courts, 22

CRIM. JUST.

118.
JUDGES'

119.

24 (Fall 2007).

See Anne Harper & Michael J. Finkle, Mental Health Courts, 51

J. 4 (Spring 2012).
E.g., Judge Stephanie Rhoades of Alaska; see Shauhin Talesh, Mental

Health Court Judges as Dynamic Risk Managers: A New Conceptualization of
the Role of Judges, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 93, 115 (2007) (discussing Judge

Rhoades).
120.
See Sana Loue, The Involuntary Civil Commitment of Mentally Ill
Persons in the United States and Romania: A Comparative Analysis, 23 J.
LEGAL MED. 211, 235 n.120 (2002) ("sanist biases may be reduced through the

establishment of mental health courts, with a judiciary trained to be sensitive to
such issues") (citing Elaine M. Andrews & Stephanie Rhoades, Anchorage District Court Initiates Two New Programs:People with DisabilitiesOffered Alternatives in Judicial Proceeding, 23 ALASKA BAR RAG I (May/June 1999)). 1
discuss this proposition in Perlin, Best Friend,supra note 22, at 748.
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CONCLUSION

Mental health courts - when structured properly and when
chaired by a judge who "buys in" to the TJ model - are perfect
exemplars of the practical utility of therapeutic jurisprudence. 12 1
The promotion and creation of such courts are consistent with TJ's
aims and aspirations, 122 especially where litigants are given the

"voice" that TJ demands.123 They are grounded

24

and rooted 2 5 in

TJ; they reflect TJ "theory in practice."126 Although both of these
121.
See Kate Diesfeld & Brian McKenna, The Therapeutic Intent of the
New Zealand Mental Health Review Tribunal, 13 PSYCHIATRY PSYCHOL. & L.
100 (2006); Kate Diesfeld & Brian McKenna, The Unintended Impact of the
Therapeutic Intentions of the New Zealand Mental Health Review Tribunal?
Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspectives, 14 J. L. & MED. 566 (2007); see also
Jelena Popovic, Court Process and Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Have We
Thrown the Baby out with the Bathwater?, http://elaw.murdoch.edu.au/archives/

issues/special/court process.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2013). But see Johnston,
supra note 6, at 521 (arguing thoughtfully that therapeutic jurisprudence is not
an adequate basis upon which to support mental health courts). I disagree with
Prof. Johnston because I believe she fails to acknowledge the due process underpinnings of TJ theory (see id. at 533) ("Therapeutic jurisprudence offers no
opinion-in general or in specific instances-as to whether therapeutic considerations should be valued more heavily than autonomy, fairness, accuracy, consistency, perceived legitimacy of the criminal justice system, public safety, or a
host of other values"). I believe this is simply not so. See Michael L. Perlin,
"Justice's Beautiful Face": Bob Sadoff and the Redemptive Promise of Therapeutic Jurisprudence,40 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 265, 267 (2012) (quoting Perlin,

Healing, supra note 24, at 412 ("An inquiry into therapeutic outcomes does not
mean that therapeutic concerns 'trump' civil rights and civil liberties.")).
122.
See Leroy Kondo, Advocacy of the Establishment of Mental Health
Specialty Courts in the Provisionof Therapeutic Justicefor Mentally Ill Offenders, 24 SEATTLE L. REV. 373, 446-47 (2000).
123.
Nicola Ferencz & James McGuire, Mental Health Review Tribunals
in the UK: Applying a Therapeutic Jurisprudence Perspective, 37 COURT REV.

48, 51 (2000).
124.
James L. Nolan, Jr., Redefining Criminal Courts: Problem-Solving
and the Meaning ofJustice, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1541, 1541 (2003).
125.
Wasicek, supra note 40, at 126; John Cummings, The Cost of Crazy:
How TherapeuticJurisprudence and Mental Health Courts Lower Incarceration
Costs, Reduce Recidivism, and Improve Public Safety, 56 LOY. L. REV. 279,

280-81 (2010).
126.
Michael Codben & Ron Albers, Beyond the Squabble: Putting the
Tenderloin Community Justice Center in Context, 7 HASTINGS RACE &

POVERTY L. J. 53, 56 (2010).
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issues - counsel and competence - are extraordinarily critical
ones, I do not believe there is any evidence that mental health
courts cannot be redirected to confront them and to craft creative
solutions to the problems raised.
Mental health courts offer a new way of considering the
linkage between mental disability and the criminal justice process.
These courts are not without controversy, but the research appears
to reveal, in general, a robust relationship between the operation of
well-run mental health courts and enhanced dignity. I believe that
the expansion of such courts - keeping in mind the due process
foundation of therapeutic jurisprudence - is the best way to insure
dignity to persons with mental disabilities in the criminal justice
system.
In Drifter 's Escape, the judge casts aside his robe as he
presides over a case about which the defendant has no understanding. Later in the song, Dylan tells us:
"Outside, the crowd was stirring. You could hear it
from the door." 127
Certainly, public vengeance is a key component of our criminal
justice policies as they apply to persons with mental disabilities.128
The song concludes with the drifter escaping after a bolt of
lightning strikes the courthouse.1 29 This is not a particularly valuable strategy - hoping for lightning to strike - for lawyers representing persons with mental disabilities. The expansion of dignityproviding mental health courts is, I think, a much better option.

127. DYLAN, supra note 15.
128.
In discussing the roots of the public enmity toward the insanity defense and insanity defense pleaders, I have noted, "By nurturing emotions of
vengeance, the punishment of criminals 'furthers social solidarity and protects
against the terrifying anxiety that the forces of good might not triumph against
the forces of evil after all."' Michael L. Perlin, "The Borderline Which Separated You From Me": The Insanity Defense, the AuthoritarianSpirit, the Fear of
Faking, and the Culture of Punishment, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1375, 1386 (1997)
(quoting Bernard Diamond, From Durham to Brawner, A Futile Journey, 1973
WASH. U. L. Q. 109, 110 (1973)).
129.
DYLAN, supra note 15.

